In this paper, we apply a real-option model to study the effects of tax-rate uncertainty on a firm's decision. In doing so, we depart from the relevant literature, which focuses on fully equity-financed investment projects. By letting a representative firm borrow optimally, we show that debt finance not only encourages investment activities but can also substantially mitigate the effect of tax-rate uncertainty on investment timing.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades, increase in capital mobility has led to a sharp rise in foreign direct investments (FDIs) and multinational activity, thereby creating the conditions for international tax competition. 1 As shown in Figure 1 , among the 106 countries surveyed by KPMG (2009) , the average of corporate statutory tax rates (All) has fallen from 31.4% to 25.9% over the 1999-2008 period. While tax cuts were less pronounced in Latin American (LAT) and Asian Pacific (ASPAC) countries, much more dramatic tax cuts occurred in industrialized countries: in the European Union, for example, the decrease was sharper (i.e. from 34.2% to 23.2%). We can therefore say that, due to tax competition, firms have been operating in a tax-ratecut scenario where further reductions might occur in the future. 2 Despite these generalized tax-cut policies, the recent world crisis has led politicians to discuss a possible tax-rate increase aimed at financing the policies implemented to offset the dramatic effects of the 2008-09 recession. 3 As pointed out by Mintz (1995, p. 61) : 'When capital is sunk, governments may have the irresistible urge to tax such a capital at a high rate in the future. This endogeneity of government decisions results in a problem of time consistency in tax policy, whereby governments may wish to take actions in the future that would be different from what would be originally planned'. In this case, the commitment failure leads to the well-known 'capital-levy problem', which is related to a firm's fear that a 1. See, for example, Devereux et al. (2008) and Ghinamo et al. (2010) . 2. KPMG experts add that 'we have found no country anywhere that has raised its rate since last year' (KPMG, 2009, p. 6 ). 3. The sharp increase in public deficits throughout the world will probably be tackled not only by cutting public spending but also by increasing tax rates. Some US states (such as Oregon and Illinois) have already planned or are planning to raise statutory tax rates. Similarly, public budget concerns in the eurozone make tax rate increases more likely in some countries. government can decide to raise taxes on capital already invested. 4 Firms are aware that the government can take a different action from that initially planned and try to anticipate its tax choices. Whatever the sign of the tax-rate change is, the empirical evidence shows that tax-rate changes are not only frequent but also are difficult to foresee by taxpayers. This means that tax changes are a source of uncertainty, as well documented by the literature since the 1980s. 5 Tax uncertainty is a fairly important problem and must be analyzed with appropriate techniques. Over the last decade, scholars have used the real-option approach to deal with tax uncertainty. 6 Hassett and Metcalf (1999) used a model with an output price following a geometric Brownian motion and an uncertain investment tax credit to explain the effects of tax policy uncertainty on aggregate investment. They concluded that tax policy uncertainty tends to delay investment under a continuous-time random walk, but increases the capital stock under a Poisson jump process. Böhm and Funke (2000) showed that investment is not very sensitive to the degree of tax policy uncertainty, when capital is gradually accumulated. Agliardi (2001) analyzed investment effects of uncertain investment tax credits following a downward jump-diffusion process. She found that tax policy uncertainty delays investment. Böckem (2001) studied whether the threat of imposing a sales tax can lead to a systematic delay of investment. In a dynamic investment model with demand and tax uncertainty, she showed that no systematic delay of investment is expected to occur. Panteghini (2001a; 2001b ) used a Poisson process for the tax rate and proved that investment may be unaffected by tax policy uncertainty, if an ACE-type system is Figure 1 A tax-rate comparison by global region, 1999-2008 Source: KPMG (2009).
4. For further details on the capital-levy problem, see Eichengreen (1990) . 5. See, for example, Alvarez et al. (1998) and the related literature mentioned in their article. 6. As argued by Pindyck (2007) : 'sunk costs do matter in decision-making when those costs have yet to be sunk'. This implies that the effects of tax uncertainty must be analyzed from an ex ante perspective, i.e. when firms are still free to choose not only whether but also when to invest.
Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies under Tax-Rate Uncertainty r 2011 The Authors German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik applied. Niemann (2004) defined two neutrality conditions: first-order neutrality, which requires the complete ineffectiveness of taxation on investment decisions; second-order neutrality, which means that the stochastic nature of taxation does not alter investment decisions. In a subsequent article (Niemann, 2006) , he analyzed combined tax-rate and tax-base uncertainty by assuming a stochastic tax payment. He showed that the uncertainty of tax payments has an ambiguous impact on investment timing. 7 Recently, Chen and Funke (2008) have found that political uncertainty (including discontinuous changes in taxation) discourages FDI decisions.
It is worth noting that all these articles deal with tax uncertainty by assuming fully equity-financed investment decisions. However, the evidence shows that investment and financial decisions are related and, hence, should be jointly analyzed. To provide a more realistic analysis, therefore, we depart from the relevant literature and let a firm borrow optimally. Given the importance that the statutory tax rate has on financial choices (see, e.g., Leland, 1994) , we will focus on tax-rate uncertainty. Moreover, since the evidence shows that tax-rate changes are discrete, we will describe them with a Poisson process. In doing so, we will be able to study two possible scenarios: a standard capital-levy one, where the tax rate is expected to rise, and a tax-competition one, where there is a downward trend in tax rates.
Given this model, we will study investment and financing decisions jointly. As will be shown, debt finance not only encourages investment activities but also can substantially mitigate the effect of tax-rate uncertainty on investment timing. In particular, using a numerical simulation, based on realistic parameter values, we will show that a highly volatile tax system may have a negligible impact on investment choices, if firms can choose their capital structure. If, however, they are credit constrained, the impact of tax-rate uncertainty is much more significant. Our results have implications in terms of both empirical analysis and policy decision making. First, we can say that econometric investigation should control for the existence (absence) of financial flexibility. Otherwise, estimates would be misleading. Second, the effects of a hot policy debate on future (and uncertain) tax-rate changes crucially depend on the efficiency of the financial market and, in particular, on the existence/absence of credit constraints.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows our main findings and discusses how tax-rate uncertainty affects a firm's choices. Section 4 makes a comparison with the results obtained in the relevant literature, and then discusses the implications of our findings. After a brief summary, Section 5 discusses some possible extensions that are left for future research.
THE MODEL
In this section we introduce an earning before interest and taxes (EBIT)-based model in the spirit of Goldstein et al. (2001) . By focusing on cash flows rather than stocks, we can better describe the investment and financial strategies of an infinitely lived risk-neutral firm. 8 7. On this point, see also Sureth (2002) . 8. For a study on risk-averse firms' investment choices, see Niemann and Sureth (2004; Let us denote P t as the firm's EBIT at time t and assume that it evolves as follows
where a is the expected rate of growth, s is the instantaneous standard deviation of dP t =P t and dz t is the increment of a Brownian motion. Moreover, let us introduce the following hypotheses.
Assumption 1. The firm must pay a sunk start-up cost, denoted by I, to undertake a risky project.
Assumption 2. The firm can borrow from a perfectly competitive risk-neutral credit sector, characterized by a given risk-free interest rate r.
Assumption 3. The firm can decide how much to borrow by choosing a nonrenegotiable coupon C.
Assumption 4. Default takes place when P t goes to C.
Assumption 5. The cost of default is equal to uC with u40.
According to Assumption 1, the firm must pay a sunk cost. This means that investment projects are irreversible. Assumption 2 entails a simple framework where lenders are price-takers and become shareholders in the event of default. In line with Leland (1994) , the firm chooses an optimal coupon (Assumption 3). 9 For simplicity, the capital structure is assumed to be static, i.e. financial policy cannot be reviewed later. 10 Moreover, according to Assumption 4, default occurs when the firm's profit, net of its debt obligations, is nil. 11 The existence of some default cost is necessary to obtain a finite optimal debt-equity ratio. 12 For this reason we assume that, when default takes place, a sunk default cost, equal to uC, is faced (Assumption 5). 13 9. Given C and the risk-free interest rate r, the market value of debt can be calculated. It is worth noting that, in the absence of arbitrage, setting the coupon first, and then calculating the market value of the debt is equivalent to first choosing the value of the debt and then calculating the effective interest rate. The ratio between C and the market value of the debt is equal to the effective interest rate (which is given by the sum between r and the default risk premium). 10. Ruling out the option to renegotiate debt does not affect the qualitative properties of the model.
For a detailed analysis of dynamic tradeoff strategies, with costly debt renegotiation, see, for example, Goldstein et al. (2001) , and Hennessy and Whited (2005) . 11. Assumption 4 implies that debt is protected. As pointed out by Leland (1994) , minimum net-worth requirements, implied by protected debt, are common in short-term debt financing. For further details on default conditions, see Brennan and Schwartz (1977) , and Smith and Warner (1979) . For a comparison between protected and unprotected debt financing, see also Panteghini (2007a) . 12. For further details on this point, see Leland (1994) and Amaro de Matos (2001, Ch. 2) . 13. The quality of results does not change if, like Leland (1994) , we assume that default costs are proportional to a firm's value. Let us next introduce taxation. We define t as the tax rate and assume that interest payments are fully deductible. As to the treatment of the lender's receipts, the evidence shows that effective tax rates on capital income are fairly low. For simplicity, therefore, we disregard personal taxation and assume that the lender's predefault tax burden is nil, so that her after-tax profit function at any instant t is simply C. 14 When, however, default takes place, the lender becomes a shareholder and is then subject to corporate taxation.
Given these assumptions a firm's after-tax profit function, at time t, is equal to
Given Assumption 4, therefore, default takes place when P t N 5 0. This means that the default threshold point is C.
Let us finally model tax-rate uncertainty. We assume that the tax rate follows a Poisson process. Given an initial tax rate t 0 , at any short time interval dt there is a probability ldt that the tax rate changes to t 1 (9 t 0 ). Hence, we can write
where Dt 5 t 1 À t 0 . Given (3), we can therefore focus on:
1. a capital-levy scenario, where the tax rate is expected to rise (i.e. Dt40); 2. a tax-competition scenario, where the tax rate is expected to decrease (i.e. Dto0).
In order to study a firm's choices, we need to calculate both its value function, i.e. its net present value (NPV) (for a given level of P) and its option value, i.e. the value of its option to delay investment (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) : we will define them as V i ( Á ) and O i ( Á ), respectively. Subscript i is equal to 0 (1) when t 5 t 0 (t 5 t 1 ). Using dynamic programming, we will calculate these functions as the summation between the current profit (if any) earned in the short interval dt and the remaining value, that is, the value after the instant dt has passed. For simplicity, hereafter we will omit the time variable t.
The value function
To keep the model as simple as possible, let us assume that there is no agency conflict between equityholders and bondholders. This means that financial and real decisions are made to maximize total firm value. 15 Using a backward approach, we will first focus on the value function after the tax-rate change: in this case the relevant rate is t 1 and the value function will be denoted by V 1 ( P; C). Subsequently, we will focus on the before-tax-change scenario, where the current statutory rate is t 0 .
14. This simplifying assumption is in line with Graham and Harvey (2001, p. 190) , who find 'very little evidence that executives are concerned about . . . personal taxes' when they run business plans (including financial decisions). 15. If an agency conflict were introduced, managers could be induced to maximize levered equity value at the expenses of bondholders (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mauer and Ott, 2000; Mauer and Sarkar, 2005; Myers, 1977) . We leave this important extension for future research. The value function V 1 ( P; C) is given by the sum between the equity value E 1 ( P; C) and the debt value D 1 ( P; C), net of the investment cost I. As shown in Appendix A.1, it amounts to
where d r À a40 is the so-called 'dividend yield'. 16 In line with Leland (1994; 1998) , therefore, total firm value is equal to the value of assets, plus the value of tax benefits from debt, less the value of potential default costs. This value function includes the benefits and costs in all future periods. Function (4) is based on an extended version of Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) . If we compare (4) with Modigliani and Miller's (1963, p. 436) formula (3) we can say that 1 À t 1 ð ÞP=d is the value of the unlevered firm. Similarly, Modigliani and Miller (1963) account for the tax benefit arising from debt financing. However, (4) contains the additional term ðt 1 =rÞ þ u ½ C P=C ð Þ b 2 , which measures the contingent cost of default. This means that a firm not only faces a sunk cost uC but also loses the tax benefit of interest deductibility (t 1 C=r). The present value of the default cost is multiplied by P=C ð Þ b 2 , with b 2 o0 (see Appendix A), which measures the contingent value of 1h in the event of default.
Before the tax-rate change
Let us now calculate the value function before the tax-rate change, V 0 ( P; C). As shown in Appendix A.2, V 0 ( P; C) is given by the sum of the equity value E 0 ( P; C) and the debt value D 0 ( P; C) before the tax-rate change, net of the investment cost I, i.e.
16. The relevant discount rate of the first term is d r. This means that the present value of future cash flow accounts for the expected growth rate a ! 0 of P.
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, is the contingent value of 1h, under taxrate uncertainty. As can be seen, the relevant discount rates are d þ l and r þ l (instead of d and r), respectively. This is due to the fact that, before the tax-rate jump, present value calculations must account for the probability l of this tax change.
It is worth noting that b 2 (l) depends on the probability of the tax-rate change. This implies that the contingent value of default is affected by tax uncertainty. To understand this important effect, let us compare the tax-uncertainty case with the tax-certainty one. Since b 2 (l)ob 2 o0, the inequality P=C ð Þ b 2 > P=C ð Þ b 2 l ð Þ holds. This means that the contingent value of 1h under tax-rate uncertainty is less than that under tax-rate certainty.
Both the expected changes in the equity and debt value account for the tax-rate change and are proportional to the differential (t 1 À t 0 ). In particular, X( P; C) is given by the product between the tax-rate differential (t 1 À t 0 ) and the term in square brackets, which measures the contingent value of equity: this term is given by the difference between a firm's equity value, with zero default risk, i.e. P=ðd þ lÞ À ½C=ðr þ lÞ ½ , and the contingent value of equity in the event of default, i.e. ðC=ðd þ lÞÞ À ðC=ðr þ lÞÞ
measures the impact of the tax-rate change on the benefit of interest deductibility. It is thus equal to the product between the tax-rate differential (t 1 À t 0 ) and the contingent value of Ch
The option value
Let us next deal with the option to invest. Accordingly, we denote the option value O 1 ( P; C) and O 0 ( P; C), under tax-rate certainty and uncertainty, respectively. Again, we will follow a backward approach.
After the tax-rate change
Let us start with the after-change scenario. Since the tax-rate change has already occurred, policy uncertainty has vanished. As shown in Appendix B.1, the option function is equal to
where H 1 is an unknown. To calculate H 1 , we denote P as the entry threshold level above which investment is undertaken, and apply the value matching condition (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
Substituting (4) and (6) into (7) and H 1 gives 
If, therefore, P < P, it is optimal for a firm to delay investment rather than to exercise its real option immediately. If, however, PZ P, the optimal strategy is to invest immediately. As can be seen, the option value is given by the product between P= P ð Þ b 1 , i.e. the present value of 1h contingent on the entry decision, and
that is, the NPV at point P ¼ P (i.e. when the investment project is optimally undertaken).
Before the tax-rate change
The option value under tax-rate uncertainty can be written as follows (see Appendix
where b P is the threshold point. Again, if P < b P, it is optimal to delay investment. The opposite is true for PZ b P. Function
measures the contingent effect of tax-rate uncertainty on the option value (see
CÞ are the value functions at the relevant threshold levels b P and P, respectively, and P= b
measures the impact of tax-rate uncertainty on the contingent evaluation of assets.
It is worth remarking that if P < b P tax-rate uncertainty delays the investment, while the opposite is true if P > b P. As will be shown, a delay (anticipation) will take place if Dt40 (Dto0). 17 17. Note that, without tax-rate uncertainty, the equality b P ¼ P holds and therefore b P= P b 1 ¼ 1. 
The firm's problem
Given the NPV and the option value, let us next analyze a firm's decision on both the coupon C and the investment timing. Again, we will start with the after-tax reform, and then focus on the before-tax-rate change case.
After the tax-rate change
If the tax-rate change has already occurred, a firm's problem is one of choosing both the optimal investment trigger point P * 1 and the optimal coupon C 1 . This result can be obtained by maximizing (9) with respect to P and C, i.e. 18 max P>0;C>0
Solving problem (13) gives (Appendix C.1)
The threshold point P * 1 is given by the product between the term 1=ð1 þ m 1 Þ, which measures the effect of dept financing on the firm's trigger point, and ½b 1 =ðb 1 À 1Þ½rI=ð1 À t 1 Þ, which is the value of the threshold point under full-equity finance (see Panteghini, 2007a; 2007b) . Since 1=ð1 þ m 1 Þ < 1, debt financing encourages investment (namely includes a firm to invest earlier). The reasoning behind this result is straightforward: if a firm can borrow, it will invest earlier in order to benefit from interest deductibility ( Panteghini, 2007b) .
18. Note that there is an alternative approach to solving the firm's maximization problem. First, we should remember that the firm aims at borrowing in order to maximize its value. This means that at point P ¼ P the firm chooses the optimal coupon by means of the following first-order condition
with ð›V 2 1 ðP; CÞ=›C 2 Þ P¼ P < 0. Second, in line with Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , both the value matching condition (VMC) and the smooth pasting condition (SPC) must be applied, i.e.
where the first one is equal to (7) . Therefore, a three-equation system with three unknowns is obtained and can be solved. It is worth noting that its solution is the same as that obtained in our model. In both cases, equation (7) is applied. Moreover, the first-order condition of (13) w.r.t. C coincides with (12). Finally, the SPC is equal to the first-order condition of problem (13) w.r.t. P. Since equations are the same, we find the same solutions for the investment trigger point P * 1 , the optimal coupon C 1 and the parameter value H 1 . The optimal coupon C 1 is obtained by equating the marginal tax benefit of debt financing to the marginal cost of default. As can be seen, the optimal coupon is proportional to the threshold point P * 1 ; and, hence, to the investment cost I. As shown in Appendix C.2, both P * 1 and C 1 are increasing in t 1 . The positive effect of t 1 on the threshold point P * 1 is due to the fact that the higher the tax rate, the greater the option value is (i.e. the higher the opportunity cost of immediate investment is), and the lower the after-tax value of the project is. Both effects cause a delay in investment. The positive sign of › C 1 =›t 1 means that the higher the rate t 1 , the greater the benefit of interest deductibility, the higher the optimal coupon is. As shown in Panteghini (2007a) , › C 1 =›u < 0: This means that an increase in u raises the expected cost of default, and, therefore, discourages borrowing. 19 Moreover, we can show (see Appendix C.2) that the ratio C 1 = P * 1 is increasing in t 1 and decreasing in u. This means that a higher tax rate entails a higher tax benefit, and, therefore, stimulates borrowing for any given level of EBIT. The opposite is true for u: a higher default cost raises the marginal cost of borrowing, and, therefore, reduces the ratio C 1 = P * 1 .
Before the tax-rate change
Under tax-rate uncertainty and before investment, a firm's problem is as follows
where O 0 P; C; b P; P is defined by (9)-(11). Solving (15) gives the following firstorder conditions
b P * and C * are the solutions of systems (16) and (17). Although equations (16) and (17) have no closed-form solution, their analysis gives us some hint about the effects of tax-rate uncertainty. To do so, let us start with the tax-certainty scenario. Setting l 5 0 yields b 1 l ð Þj l¼0 ¼ b 1 , and therefore, the terms
and
go to zero. In this case the two-equation system (16) and (17) collapses to the taxrate-certainty system (C1) and (C2) (in Appendix C.1), with the relevant tax rate t 0 . This first step allows us to show that terms (18) and (19) invested when P reaches P, i.e. when it is optimal to invest in the absence of taxrate uncertainty, the latter measures the wedge on contingent evaluation due to tax-rate uncertainty. As we can see, the wedge P= b P b 1 l ð ÞÀb 1 depends on the taxrate-uncertainty trigger point b P and on the difference [b 1 (l) À b 1 ]. This means that the higher the parameter l, the larger the tax-rate-uncertainty wedge is, or, equivalently, the greater the distortion caused by tax-rate uncertainty.
A similar reasoning holds for term (19), which enters equation (17). As can be seen, the marginal condition on the coupon depends on the marginal benefit of debt financing, after the tax-rate change (i.e. ›V 1 ð P; CÞ=›C). Moreover, it is proportional to the contingent value of 1h invested when P reaches P (i.e.
has two opposing effects on equations (16) and (17): while it raises the left-hand side of (16), it reduces the left-hand side of (17). As will be shown in the next section, this opposing effect will lead to an increase in the marginal cost of immediate investment and, at the same time, a drop in the marginal cost of debt finance.
A NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In order to analyze how a firm's ability to borrow affects investment decisions, let us compare the tax-uncertainty scenario with the tax-certainty one. In both cases, we assume that the starting tax rate is t 0 . While in the tax-certainty case it will be unchanged, under tax-rate uncertainty this rate is expected to jump (either up or down).
Under tax-rate certainty, the firm's problem is equivalent to (13), with the assumption that, here, the relevant tax rate is t 0 (instead of t 1 ). Hence, its solutions 
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Obviously, the comparative statics results of Appendix C.2 on solutions (14) hold also for solutions (20) . In other terms, the threshold point and the optimal coupon of (20), as well as the ratio C 0 = P * 0 are increasing in the tax rate t 0 . As pointed out, the tax-rate-uncertainty problem (15) has no closed-form solution. For this reason, we need a numerical analysis to compare the tax-certainty with the tax-uncertainty case. In doing so, we will use the benchmark parameter values of Table 1 . In line with Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 157; 1999, p. 193) we set r 5 d 5 0.05 and s 5 0.4. 20 Furthermore, we assume that u 5 3. This means that, given r 5 0.05, the default cost is about 10% of the debt value. 21 As we have seen in Figure 1 , over the last decade, the average statutory tax rate has been about 30%. Accordingly, we set t 0 5 0.3. Given the high heterogeneity of the tax-rate jumps occurring over the past decade, we will assume that t 1 ranges from 0.1 to 0.55. 22 We will therefore be able to study both the capital-levy and the tax-competition case.
Finally, letting l range from 0.1 to 1 entails that the expected time ranges from x[T] 5 1 (with l 5 1) and x[T] 5 10 (with l 5 0.1). 23 Let us first look at the effects of the tax-rate differential Dt on both the threshold point and the optimal coupon. Figures 2(a) and (b) show that both b P * and C * are positively affected by the tax-rate differential Dt. The reasoning behind this result is as follows. An increase in Dt means that, given t 0 and l, a higher average tax rate (which must account for both the current rate t 0 and the expected future one t 1 ) will be levied. The heavier the expected tax burden, the higher the investment trigger point is (i.e. the later the investment will be undertaken). Similarly, an increase in Dt raises the optimal coupon C * . This is due to the fact that a higher average tax rate leads to a higher tax benefit of interest deductibility, thereby encouraging borrowing. Figures 2(a) and (b) also compare the tax-rate-certainty case (i.e. when Dt 5 0) with the tax-rate-uncertainty one (i.e. with Dt6 ¼0). In particular, if a tax cut is expected to occur (Dto0) at time x[T] 5 1/l, both the threshold point and the optimal coupon are less than the tax-rate-certainty ones. The opposite is true if Dt40. This effect can be explained as follows: if Dto0 (Dt40), the expected tax 20. The quality of results does not change if we use different values of s. For further details see, for example, Leland (1994) . 21. This percentage is in line with Branch's (2002) estimates. 22. Of course, the quality of results does not change if a different value of t 0 is assumed. 23. As shown by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 170 ), the expected time T of the tax-rate change is equal to x T ½ ¼ R 1 0 lTe ÀlT dT ¼ 1=l. If, therefore, l goes to zero, then x[T] goes to infinity and the relevant tax rate is always t 0 . If, however, l goes to infinity, the tax-rate change immediately occurs and the relevant tax rate will be t 1 forever.
Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies under Tax-Rate Uncertainty r 2011 The Authors German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik burden is less (higher) than that faced under tax-rate certainty. This stimulates (discourages) investment. Moreover, if Dto0 (Dt40), a firm foresees a lower (higher) tax benefit due to interest deductibility. This will discourage (encourage) borrowing, and, therefore, the optimal coupon will be lower (higher) than under tax-rate certainty.
Moreover, Figure 2 (b), where D * and D denotes the debt value after substituting b P * , C * and P * 0 , C 0 , respectively, shows the relation between the coupon/debt ratio (which measures the market interest rate on debt, i.e. the summation between the risk-free rate r and the risk premium) and the tax-rate differential Dt. As can be seen, this ratio is increasing in Dt under the tax-uncertainty case. Of course, under taxrate certainty, this ratio is constant by definition, since Dt 5 0. In both cases, the effective interest rate is higher than r 5 0.05: this is due to the existence of a positive default risk premium.
If Dt40 (Dto0), the tax-rate-uncertainty effective interest rate is higher (lower) than the tax-certainty one. This is due to the fact that an expected tax-rate increase encourages borrowing, thereby causing an increase in the default risk premium. This, in turn, raises the effective interest rate.
So far we have analyzed the absolute values of P and C. Let us next focus on the coupon/EBIT ratio. In doing so, we will then compare the tax-rate-certainty ratio, C 0 = P * 0 , with the tax-rate-uncertainty one, C * = b P * . As shown in Figure 3 , ratio C * = b P * is increasing in Dt (curved line); in other words, a firm's propensity to borrow increases with Dt. Of course, the ratio C 0 = P * 0 , depicted by the straight line, is constant. It is worth noting that the curved line (tax-uncertainty case) is below (above) the straight line (tax-certainty case) if Dto0 (Dt40). This means that when a tax rate is expected to decrease, the expected tax benefit of interest deductibility will be lower and, therefore, debt will be less profitable than under tax-rate certainty. The converse is true if Dt40: in this case, a firm operating in an uncertain tax environment is stimulated to raise leverage.
In Tables 2-4 , we provide a sensitivity analysis for different values of Dt, l, s and u. In order to analyze how a firm's ability to borrow affects its investment decisions, we will compare the well-known full-equity finance case (C 5 0) with the optimal-leverage case (i.e. C ¼ C * ). Accordingly, we will calculate the threshold values under both full-equity financing (i.e. b P * C ¼ 0 ð Þ) and optimal-leverage financing (i.e. b P * C ¼ C * ð Þ ). Moreover, we will calculate the differential D b Let us first focus on the effects of tax-rate uncertainty (l) on a firm's choice. As shown in Table 2 , we can see that:
1. For any given l, the inequality b
As expected, financial flexibility allows firms to invest earlier, in order to enjoy the tax benefit of interest deductibility. A similar reasoning holds when Dt 5 0. However, in the certainty case, the differential D b P * is quite small. This means that a firm's ability to borrow allows a firm to invest earlier, although this effect is almost negligible. 3. When Dt6 ¼0, the distortive effect of tax-rate uncertainty is always larger in the standard full-equity financing case. Indeed, the ability to borrow can substantially smooth the effects of tax-rate uncertainty. 4. Under the capital-levy scenario (i.e. with Dt40), the threshold points b P * C ¼ 0 ð Þ and b P * C ¼ C * ð Þare positively affected by l. The reasoning behind this result is simple: the higher the probability of a given tax-rate increase, the higher the expected tax burden and the higher a firm's trigger point is (and, hence, the later an investment is made). The opposite is true in a tax-competition environment (i.e. with Dto0): an increase in l reduces b P * :
To sum up, we can say that, when debt finance is allowed, tax-rate uncertainty (in terms of either a higher differential Dt or a higher probability) has a smaller impact on investment timing. For instance, our numerical analysis shows that if a dramatic tax-rate increase (t 1 from 0.3 to 0.55) was expected, its effect would be almost negligible for an optimally leveraged firm. When, instead, a borrowing constraint is binding and a firm can finance its investment only through equity issues, the effect of tax-rate uncertainty is much more significant. Let us next look at the effects of both EBIT volatility (s) and default cost (u) on a firm's decision. Results can be summarized as follows:
1. Table 3 shows that the positive effect of s on both threshold points b P * C ¼ 0 ð Þ and b P * C ¼ C * ð Þis substantial. This is due to the fact that volatility raises a firm's option value, thereby delaying investment timing. 2. As shown in subsection 2.3.1., under tax-rate certainty (with t 1 ), an increase in u raises the cost of default, and, therefore, discourages borrowing. Table 4 shows that, under tax-rate uncertainty, the effect of u on both b P * C ¼ C * ð Þ and b P * C ¼ 0 ð Þis still positive, and, therefore, causes a delay in investment. 3. For any given couple (s, Dt) and (u, Dt), the differential D b P * is positive. Again, we can see that financial flexibility allows firms to invest earlier in order to enjoy the tax benefit of interest deductibility. 4. For any given value of s and u, the value D b P * is U-shaped. This means that: (i) the differential D b P * is large when Dt j j is large, i.e. a firm's ability to borrow allows investment much earlier when a large variation of the tax rate is expected; (ii) the differential D b P * is minimum for Dt ! 0. In this case, the effect of a firm's ability to borrow on investment timing is still positive, though it is relatively small.
A DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
All the relevant articles quoted in our introduction share the hypothesis of fully equity financing. Apart from this common assumption, scholars have discussed different cases where tax uncertainty may have an ambiguous effect on investment decisions. In particular, an ambiguity may arise if either investment tax credits are assumed to change unexpectedly (Hassett and Metcalf, 1999) or uncertainty affects both corporate and interest income taxation (Niemann, 2004; 2006) . Analogously, the ability to accumulate capital gradually (see, e.g., Böhm and Funke, 2000) and the existence of some monopolistic power (Böckem, 2001 ) may smooth or even revert the effects of tax uncertainty. Using an ACE-type system, Panteghini (2001a; 2001b) has shown that tax-rate uncertainty does not affect one-off investment if the imputation rate is high enough. This result is an application of the well-known bad news principle (see Bernanke, 1983) , according to which if taxation affects only good events, it is neutral in terms of investment timing.
In this paper, however, we have not looked for another possible source of ambiguity. Rather, we have assumed a one-off investment strategy that is distorted by taxation. Our main findings are contained in Table 5 that summarizes the results described in Tables 2-4. As we have shown, an increase in s and u discourages investment. Moreover, the effects of the Poisson jump (see parameter l) depend on the sign of the expected tax-rate change. Given this framework, we have shown that the distortive effect of tax-rate uncertainty is dramatically reduced when debt finance is allowed.
These results have interesting implications in terms of both empirical analysis and policy decisions. Given our findings, we can say that when investment activities are studied, empirical investigation should control for the existence Table 5 The signs of parameter values' effects on investment decisions (absence) of financial flexibility. Indeed, disregarding the characteristics of financial markets would be misleading. Similarly, the effect of a hot policy debate on future (and uncertain) tax-rate changes may have a significantly negative impact on investment, if firms are credit constrained. If, however, financial markets are efficient and hence provide a sufficient amount of resources, the same debate may lead to a negligible impact on investment, since firms can smooth the effects of tax-rate uncertainty by optimally adjusting their capital structure. It is worth noting that we assumed the absence of any renegotiation of debt. Of course we expect that, whenever renegotiation is allowed, a firm enjoys a higher degree of flexibility and the effect of tax-rate uncertainty is further mitigated.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have applied a real-option model to study the effects of tax-rate uncertainty on both investment timing and the optimal capital structure of a representative firm.
By departing from the relevant literature, which has extensively analyzed fully equity-financed investment decisions, we have shown that the ability to borrow allows firms to invest earlier in order to enjoy the tax benefit of interest deductibility. More importantly, we have shown that a highly volatile tax system may have a negligible impact on investment choices, when firms can choose their capital structure. This leads us to conclude that debt finance allows a firm to smooth substantially the distortive effects of tax-rate uncertainty.
In this paper we have used some simplifying assumptions, such as the symmetric treatment of profits and losses, as well as the absence of personal taxation, agency costs and any bargaining process between stakeholders (including renegotiation and partial conversion of debt into equity). The elimination of any of these simplifying assumptions is an interesting topic that we leave for future research. Finally, evidence shows that tax uncertainty is caused by both tax-rate and tax-base changes (e.g. via changes in investment tax credits and fiscal depreciation allowances), as well as by unexpected changes in the treatment of interest income. Therefore, a promising extension of our model would entail the joint analysis of sources of uncertainty.
APPENDIX A: THE VALUE FUNCTIONS
In order to calculate a firm's value function with tax-rate uncertainty, we must first focus on the value function after the tax-rate change, i.e. when tax rate is t 1 . Subsequently, we will deal with the value function under tax-rate uncertainty, i.e. when the current tax rate is t 0 .
A.1. The value function (4)
Using dynamic programming, let us calculate the predefault equity value E 1 ( P; C) as a summation between the net cash flow (1 À t 1 )( P À C), in the short interval dt, and its future value after the instant dt has passed where x[E 1 ( P þ dP; C)] is the expected value of equity at time t þ dt. Expanding the right-hand side of (A1), applying Itô's lemma and rearranging gives the following non-arbitrage condition
where d r À a, E 1 P ›E=›P and E 1 PP › 2 E=› 2 P. Note that, when default takes place (i.e. when P goes to C), shareholders are expropriated, and, therefore, the value of their claim is nil, i.e. E 1 (C; C) 5 0. Accordingly, the general-form solution of (A2) is
where b 1 ¼ ð1=2Þ À ððr À dÞ=s 2 Þ þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ððr À dÞ=s 2 Þ À ð1=2Þ ð Þ 2 þ ð2r=s 2 q Þ > 1 and b 2 ¼ ð1=2Þ À ððr À dÞ=s 2 Þ À ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ððr À dÞ=s 2 Þ À ð1=2Þ ð Þ 2 þ ð2r=s 2 q Þ < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation CðbÞ ¼ ð1=2Þs 2 bðb À 1Þ þ ðr À dÞb À r ¼ 0. Let us next calculate A 1 and A 2 . In the absence of any financial bubbles, A 1 is nil. To calculate A 2 , we must consider that default occurs when P drops to C, namely the condition
holds. Rearranging this equation gives
Using these results, we can therefore rewrite (A3) as
Following the same procedure let us next write the predefault value of debt as
When default takes place and the firm is expropriated, the lender's claim is given by the firm's value and is therefore equal to Expanding the right-hand side, applying Itô's lemma and rearranging (A5) and (A6) gives the following non-arbitrage condition:
The closed-form solution of (A7) is
To calculate B 2 we use the boundary condition D(0; C) 5 0 which means that when P falls to zero the lender's postdefault claim is nil. This implies that B 2 5 0. In the absence of any financial bubble, we have B 1 5 D 1 5 0. Finally, to calculate D 2 we let the predefault branch of (A8) equate its after-default one, net of the default cost uC, at point P 5 C. We thus obtain
Solving (A9) for D 2 yields D 2 ¼ ðð 1 À t 1 ð ÞCÞ=dÞ À ðC=rÞ À uC ½ C Àb 2 , and hence, (A8) reduces to
The summation of (A4) and (A10), net of the investment cost I, yields
A.2. The value function (5) Following the same procedure we can calculate the value function before the taxrate change. Again, we write the predefault value of equity as
As can be seen, E 0 ( P; C) is equal to (1 À t 0 )( P À C) plus the weighted average of functions x[E 0 ( P þ dP; C)] and x[E 1 ( P þ dP; C)], where the weights are given by the probability that the tax-rate change may or may not occur in the interval dt. The Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies under Tax-Rate Uncertainty r 2011 The Authors German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik probability that the change does not occur during the period dt is equal to (1 À ldt), while the probability that this event takes place is equal to ldt. Multiplying these probabilities by the expected values at time t þ dt (i.e. by e Àrdt x[E 0 ( P þ dP; C)] when the tax-rate change does not occur and by e Àrdt x[E 1 ( P þ dP; C)] when the change occurs, respectively) and adding (1 À t 0 )( P À C) thus gives E 0 ( P; C). 24 Expanding its right-hand side, applying Itô's lemma and rearranging gives
Let us next subtract (A2) from (A12) so that
Solving (A13) yields
are the roots of the characteristic equation
Note that, in the absence of bubbles, we have F 1 5 0. Using (A14) and (A15), and rearranging, we obtain
24. For further details, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 203 If default occurs, the value of equity goes to zero, i.e. E 0 (C; C) 5 0. Using this default condition and solving (A16) for F 2 we can find
Hence, the value of equity is equal to
Let us now calculate the value of debt before the tax-rate change. As usual, we can write it as
where K 5 C and K 5 (1 À t 0 )P are the flow before and after default, respectively. Expanding the right-hand side of (A18), applying Itô's lemma and rearranging gives the following non-arbitrage condition
Subtracting (A7) from (A19) and defining
where J 5 0 and J 5 (t 1 À t 0 )P are the relevant flows before and after default, respectively. The solution of (A21) has the following form Note that, after default (but before the tax-rate change), the boundary condition Y(0; C) 5 0 holds. This implies that L 2 5 0. Moreover, in the absence of bubbles, we have L 1 5 G 1 5 0.
Remember that, after default, the lender becomes a shareholder. Therefore, using (A21) and rearranging, we can write the firm's value after default
Following the same procedure we can write the before-default value of debt
To find G 2 we let the two branches of the debt function meet at point P 5 C and account for the default cost. This means that the equality
holds. Solving (A23) for G 2 and substituting the result into (A22) yields
Using (A17) and (A24), we can finally calculate the firm's NPV (9) Using dynamic programming we can write a firm's option to invest under tax-rate certainty as O 1 P; C ð Þ¼e Àrdt x O 1 P þ dP; C ð Þ ½ Expanding its right-hand side, applying Itô's lemma and rearranging gives the following non-arbitrage condition
Solving (B1) gives the following general closed-form solution
When P goes to zero, in a geometric Brownian motion it will remain zero. This implies that H 2 5 0 (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) , and therefore (B2) reduces to (6).
B.2. The option function (10)
Let us next calculate the firm's option to invest O 0 ( P; C) under tax-rate uncertainty. Function O 0 ( P; C) is equal to the weighted average of functions x[O 0 ( P þ dP; C)] and x[O 1 ( P þ dP; C)], where the weights are given by the probability that the taxrate change may or may not occur in the interval dt. Multiplying these probabilities by the values at time t þ dt (i.e. by e À rdt x[O 0 ( P þ dP; C)] when the tax-rate change does not occur and by e À rdt x[O 1 ( P þ dP; C)] when the change occurs, respectively) gives O 0 P; C ð Þ¼ 1 À ldt ð Þ e Àrdt x O 0 P þ dP; C ð Þ ½ þ ldte Àrdt x O 1 P þ dP; C ð Þ ½ Expanding its right-hand side, applying Itô's lemma and rearranging gives the following non-arbitrage condition where Z( P; C) O 0 ( P; C) À O 1 ( P; C). Solving (B4), we have
Since Z(0; C) 5 0, we obtain Z P; C ð Þ¼Z 1 P b 1 l ð Þ and therefore, the option value can be rewritten as
To calculate Z 1 we apply the VMC at the threshold point P
Using (B5) and (B6), we obtain
which gives
and therefore
Substituting (B8) into (B7), using (B6) and rearranging gives (10).
APPENDIX C: THE FIRM'S CHOICE UNDER TAX-RATE CERTAINTY
Under tax-rate certainty, the firm's problem is (13).
C.1. The solutions
The first-order conditions of (13) with respect to C and P are respectively. Rearranging (C1) gives
Moreover, from (C1) we obtain
and hence, we can rewrite (C2) as
Rearranging and dividing (C4) by ½ 1 À b 1 ð Þ 1 À t 1 ð Þ=r one obtains
Substituting (C3) into (C5) gives P * 1 ¼
where m 1 ðt 1 =ð1 À t 1 ÞÞðb 2 =ðb 2 À 1ÞÞ ð1=ð1 À b 2 ÞÞðt 1 =ðt 1 þ urÞÞ ½ À 1 b 2 > 0. The secondorder condition with respect to C is verified. Indeed
Since b 2 o0, derivative › 2 O 1 =›C 2 is always negative. Solution (14) is thus obtained. 
